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1 
An Intersectionality-Based Policy Analysis of High Seas Policy Making Stagnation and 1 
Equity in United Nations Negotiations 2 
The American Academy of Social Work and Social Welfare’s Grand Challenges for 3 
Social Work call on social workers to “create social responses to a changing environment” by 4 
addressing the socioeconomic impacts of environmental challenges with a specific emphasis on 5 
“advocacy to elevate public and policy attention to the social and human dimensions of 6 
environmental change” (Kemp & Palinkas, 2015, p. 3). However, inequitable governance 7 
structures perpetuate the socioeconomic disparities created by environmental changes— 8 
threatening achievement of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals [SDGs]. As a 9 
result, social workers need to move beyond using policy to address environmental inequities, and 10 
critique the structures used for global governance of shared natural resources. One pertinent 11 
example is the governance of the high seas, or the ocean’s international waters beyond a singular 12 
country’s jurisdiction, under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 13 
[UNCLOS]. 14 
One of the ocean’s most pressing social-ecological challenges is marine fish stocks’ 15 
continued decline, with 33.1% of stocks classified as overfished (i.e., fished beyond sustainable 16 
levels) in 2015, a 1.4% increase from 2013 (Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations) 17 
[FAO], 2018). These changes are primarily perpetrated by increasing fishing pressures, driven by 18 
consumption demands predicated on greater demand for exotic fish products (e.g., sushi), trade 19 
globalization, human population growth, and increasing scientific evidence of fish’s health and 20 
nutritional benefits (FAO, 2018). And, while stocks in developed countries’ coastal waters 21 
showed some rebounds, these gains were offset by further decreases in developing countries’ 22 
stocks (FAO, 2018). The persistence of these declines is problematic: Though poorer states lack 23 
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the capacity to fish on the high seas, and no artisanal or subsistence fishing occurs that far from 24 
shore, approximately 54% of low-income, fish-reliant states depend on species that straddle 25 
and/or migrate between territorial waters and the high seas (Teh et al., 2016).  Of the 10 million 26 
tons of fish caught on the high seas, less than 1% contains species found exclusively in the high 27 
seas (Sumaila et al., 2015).  28 
Because of this straddling, high seas overfishing impacts reverberate through populations 29 
not engaged in the activity. Specifically, high seas overfishing contributes to coastal stock 30 
depletions—threatening many of the world’s most vulnerable populations. While 3.1 billion 31 
people, or more than 40% of the world’s population, rely on seafood as their primary protein 32 
source, in most coastal developing countries, marine fish constitute more than 50% of dietary 33 
protein intake (FAO, 2016). Approximately 90% of small-scale (e.g., subsistence and artisanal), 34 
marine capture fishers worldwide (or an estimated 22-26 million impoverished people) live in 35 
coastal developing countries where few alternative livelihood activities exist (Teh & Sumaila, 36 
2013). Therefore, high seas governance is a social justice issue of relevance to ecosocial work. 37 
This paper offers an Intersectionality-Based Policy Analysis [IBPA] (Hankivsky, 2012) of 38 
United Nations [UN] policymaking related to the high seas, including an empirical analysis of 39 
committee structures and voting patterns to support this conceptual framework, and an 40 
examination of the differential impacts of high seas policymaking on marginalized global 41 
populations. The IBPA framework evaluates how intersecting identities and characteristics of a 42 
population – here, global states – perpetuate inequities and privileges in policy problems, 43 
processes, and responses. It is based on the premise that reducing marginalized populations to a 44 
singular identity perpetuates oppression (Hankivsky, 2012). UNCLOS, a macro policy focusing 45 
on parties to the convention, ascribes a singular identity to all parties—a member state. This 46 
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practice inhibits equity by ignoring the plurality of characteristics that formulate each state’s 47 
identity and how these characteristics interact to influence the state’s behaviors and participation 48 
in international high seas policy decision-making processes. Considering this intersectionality is 49 
also imperative to gaining a more complex understanding of the power relationships between 50 
states and how specific characteristics (e.g., major economies) may be more valued, maintaining 51 
unequal power distributions throughout the UN system. The paper concludes with 52 
recommendations for transforming the problem and the policy process with a focus on equitable 53 
outcomes and a discussion of ecosocial work’s role in global policymaking. 54 
High Seas Policy Making Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 55 
Signed in 1982, UNCLOS attempted to create a comprehensive and unified governance 56 
regime for Earth’s oceans to curb national sovereignty claims (Dieter, 2014). It demarked 57 
distinct maritime zones; ascribed national authority (and restrictions) over territorial waters, 58 
contiguous zones, and exclusive economic zones; and classified the high seas, “…all parts of the 59 
sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal 60 
waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State” as international waters 61 
beyond national jurisdiction and therefore subject to governance exclusively by UN international 62 
and multilateral laws and policies (UN, 1982, Part VII, Art. 86, para. 1). Building upon the 63 
ideology the high seas were a common-pool resource and thus, access should be open to all 64 
states regardless of geography, Article 87 advanced high seas’ “freedoms” (UN, 2017a).  65 
When states assented to UNCLOS, technology limitations prohibited or limited most high 66 
seas activities, including fishing, making strict high seas protections less important in the original 67 
negotiations (Visbeck et al., 2016). These technological limitations also constrained the scientific 68 
knowledge about the high seas available during negotiations. As technological capacity to 69 
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exploit high seas resources and scientific understanding simultaneously grew, the scientific 70 
community began advocating for new policies to address UNCLOS’ deficiencies. Since the 71 
1990s, UN entities have enacted a series of international and regional policies to address 72 
UNCLOS’ gaps and more consistently apply UNCLOS’ regulations to increase the achievement 73 
of its objectives. However, these measures are restricted by UNCLOS’ superseding authority and 74 
have primarily relied on voluntary, non-binding instruments that lack formal enforcement 75 
procedures. Benefits of these soft laws can include greater consensus and international 76 
cooperation, and easier implementation since they do not depend on each member state’s own 77 
ratification processes; however, their effectiveness can be hindered by a lack of political will to 78 
ensure compliance, which may conflict with the state’s economic interests (Visbeck et al., 2016).  79 
On December 24th, 2017, the UN adopted a resolution to convene an intergovernmental 80 
conference to negotiate a new “internationally legally binding instrument under UNLCOS on the 81 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national 82 
jurisdiction” (UN, 2017a, para. 12). This vote was the culmination of more than a decade of 83 
negotiations, and the work of four preparatory meetings convened between 2016 and 2017 to 84 
address scientific concerns of inadequate high seas protection and regulation (High Seas Alliance 85 
[HSA], 2017). While rhetoric around the length and stagnation of preliminary negotiations 86 
focused on tensions between conservation and management for maximum economic and 87 
sustainable exploitation, including that espoused by delegates from wealthier states (UN, 2017b), 88 
less attention was afforded to the underlying power differentials between UN member states.  89 
Building on SDG 14, “Life Below Water,” the upcoming internationally binding 90 
instrument negotiations present an opportunity to formally institutionalize the SDG’s 91 
environmental, economic, and social equity aims through more protection oriented high seas 92 
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regulations (Editorial, 2018). However, socioeconomic and political inequities perpetuated by 93 
international policy making processes, including the recent UNCLOS preparatory meetings, may 94 
undermine the SDGs’ social justice aims. Scholars have already noted the divergent positions 95 
between developed and developing countries in the original UNLCOS negotiations (e.g., 96 
Stevenson & Oxman, 1994) and NGOs have critiqued UNCLOS and its subsequent mechanisms 97 
for regulatory shortcomings and gaps (e.g., Gjerde, Currie, Wowk, & Sack, K., 2013). However, 98 
many critiques have not considered power differentials potentially entrenched in the UN system, 99 
and if existent, how they may influence state engagement or lack thereof in international policy 100 
making. The failure to create and implement binding laws more strictly regulating the high seas 101 
serves the economic interests of privileged states (i.e., industrialized and large/major economies) 102 
while potentially threatening the security of vulnerable states (i.e., small economies, Least 103 
Developed Countries [LDCs] and Small Island Developing States [SIDS]). This power dynamic 104 
must be understood and remedied to advance greater equity in the new treaty. 105 
Current Representations of the Problem 106 
UNCLOS and the subsequent UN Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement [UNFSA] 107 
established intergovernmental regional fisheries management organizations [RFMOs] as the 108 
primary high seas governance mechanism (UN, 1995). Any state with a financial or practical 109 
interest in the region’s fisheries and stock management can be a member of a RFMO, and states 110 
can, and do, belong to multiple RFMOs. Existing critiques of UNCLOS and its subsequent 111 
multilateral and regional policies have often centered on RFMOs’ ineffectiveness in maintaining 112 
productive high seas fish stocks. Reasons for this ineffectiveness include diversity and range in 113 
directives amongst RFMOs; the production and dissemination of inaccurate catch and by-catch 114 
data; member state favoritism; inadequate performance review criteria; a lack of transparency 115 
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around decision-making processes; enforcement and compliance challenges; exploitation of flag 116 
state jurisdiction; inconsistencies in confronting illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) 117 
fishing; and political interference suppressing scientific concerns (Dieter, 2014; Gjerde et al., 118 
2014). The use of voluntary and non-binding international and multilateral instruments has failed 119 
to address these RFMO problems, primarily because RFMOs can fail to implement 120 
recommendations with impunity (Gjerde et al., 2013). Though itself binding, UNCLOS also 121 
lacks global compliance mechanisms, instead relying on the right of exclusive jurisdiction for 122 
flag states—a mechanism with consistently abused loopholes (Dieter, 2014).  123 
The representation of high seas overfishing resulting from fragmented RFMO governance 124 
schemes is important and scientifically justified. However, by constructing the policy problem 125 
around the aggregate collection of RFMO party states, it is possible to overlook interactions and 126 
power differentials between member states that could influence RFMO effectiveness, and deflect 127 
responsibility away from the self-interests of powerful states onto the more collective RFMOs.  128 
Differential Impacts 129 
Empirical evidence suggests UNCLOS and RFMOs are failing in their responsibilities to 130 
protect and ensure sustainable fish stocks, with high seas fish stocks continuing to decline as a 131 
result of overfishing (Cullis-Suzuki & Pauly, 2010). Due to prohibitive costs and technological 132 
needs, most high seas fishing is monopolized by commercial vessels unsustainably subsidized by 133 
a few wealthy states (e.g., the United States, Russia, and Japan) and 10 states account for more 134 
than 60% of high seas fish catch (Sumaila et al., 2015). However, poorer, fish-reliant states will 135 
be disproportionately impacted by straddling and/or migrating fish stocks overfished on the high 136 
seas (Teh et al., 2016; White & Costello, 2014). Because overfishing’s social effects are 137 
mediated through economic structures, even if fish stocks collapse, it is likely populations in 138 
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wealthier states will have access to alternative food and nutrition sources, and comparatively 139 
little of the populations in these states rely on fishing as their sole livelihood. However, for the 140 
human populations in poorer, fish-reliant states, alternative livelihoods and nutritious food 141 
sources are severely limited. The human population is expected to reach 9.6 billion people by 142 
2050, with the majority of this increase anticipated in urban areas of coastal states with pre-143 
existing high food insecurity rates, further pressuring fish stocks that are viewed as an essential 144 
resource for poverty alleviation and the attainment of the SDGs (FAO, 2018). 145 
 Further, RFMOs are responsible for their funding, leading to notable disparities between 146 
organizations (Global Ocean Commission [GOC], 2013). The 11 largest RFMOs (four of which 147 
exclusively manage tuna stocks—a species primarily fished and consumed by wealthy states) 148 
receive approximately USD $28 million per year collectively from large repositories such as the 149 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (funded by EU member states). Even amongst the 11, 150 
funds are disproportionately allocated to RFMOs exclusively managing tuna stocks. In 2013, the 151 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission [IATTC] received over USD $6.3 million (the top 152 
funded of the 11 largest RFMOs), while the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management 153 
Organization [SPRFMO] received only USD $706,900 (the least funded of the largest 11 154 
RFMOs) (GOC, 2013). In 2014, Japan, Taiwan/China, and the United States were three of the 155 
four largest contributors to the tuna catch, and had a vested interest in contributing funds to tuna 156 
RFMOs (Galland, Rogers, & Nickson, 2016). Indeed, there are suggestions the allowable catch 157 
limits established by RFMOs are politically influenced through states’ donations (Galland et al., 158 
2016).  159 
Current Policy Responses 160 
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 After a decade of negotiations (HSA, 2017), UN General Assembly [UNGA] Resolution 161 
69/242 in 2015 called for the creation of an international, legally binding instrument under 162 
UNCLOS to enhance biodiversity protection and ensure sustainable high seas’ use (UN, 2015b). 163 
Prior to beginning negotiations in the UNGA though, four preparatory meetings were convened 164 
between 2016 and 2017 to draft text for a future treaty, offering an opportunity for economically 165 
powerful states (e.g., Russia and the United States) to undermine and dilute language regarding 166 
stricter proposed regulations before full treaty negotiations even began. For example, to achieve 167 
consensus and appease industrialized states with commercial interests in high seas’ resource 168 
exploitation, the recommendations were divided into two groups: an A-section, characterized by 169 
“convergence” among states; and, a B-section, characterized by “divergence.” The primary 170 
divisions were about the potential treaty’s institutional structures, with developing countries, 171 
“calling for an increasingly ambitious and articulated international architecture, with multiple 172 
funds and overview and support mechanisms” while developed countries, “were worried about 173 
the costs involved, advocating for a light institutional structure” (International Institute for 174 
Sustainable Development [IISD], 2017, p. 20). 175 
 A SIDS’ special case principle including equal engagement, special consideration, and 176 
“preferential treatment and access procedures for SIDS and LDCs” and the retention of language 177 
from UNFSA about special requirements for SIDS and LDCs and avoiding “disproportionate 178 
burdens” was supported by Alliance of Small Island States [AOSIS], the African group, LDCs, 179 
and the Pacific Small Island Developing States [PSIDS] (IISD, 2017, p. 9). The United States, 180 
Japan, Australia, European Union, Canada, and Switzerland all vocalized opposition. Due to lack 181 
of consensus, the special requirements and disproportionate burden language were included in 182 
the B-section, and the SIDS special case principle was excluded (IISD, 2017). Moreover, the 183 
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UNGA was not required to convene an intergovernmental conference for the negotiation of a 184 
new binding treaty, and though it did, the draft text provided by the 4th Preparatory Commission 185 
was “without prejudice to states’ positions during negotiations” (IISD, 2017, p. 4).  186 
The final draft text also suggests industrialized, large economy states may be unwilling to 187 
abandon UNCLOS’ “freedom of the seas” principle regarding fish commodities. Though the G-188 
77 (i.e., a group of 77 developing states) wanted to include language identifying the potential 189 
treaty’s overarching objective as “long-term, sustainable use and conservation,” the “long-term” 190 
descriptor was dropped due to Russia’s demands, and instead language about reinforcing 191 
effective implementation of UNCLOS was included (IISD, 2017, p. 6-7). Thus, there should be 192 
concerns the new instrument will not significantly depart from previous policy. This divergence 193 
between lower and higher income states has also occurred in historical UNCLOS negotiations, 194 
such as those concerning the management of seabeds – another resource which poorer states 195 
lacked the capacity to exploit – and the common heritage of [hu]mankind (CHM) (See Stevenson 196 
& Oxman, 1994; Nordquest, Rosenne, & Kraska, 2011; and Guntrip, 2003).  197 
An Empirical Analysis of UN Structure 198 
 A 2009 analysis of social-ecological systems approaches in multilateral environmental 199 
treaties and negotiations found “questions of power, conflicts, and inequalities” were ignored 200 
(Hornborg, 2009, p. 238), serving powerful states’ economic interests. Further, historically 201 
powerful states have been able to imbue policy development with their self-sovereignty ideology 202 
by wielding their economic power (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2006). This sub-analysis, 203 
conducted within the context of the IBPA framework, explored the likelihood that UN power 204 
structures facilitate inequities in marine policy making and other international policy making 205 
processes by providing an empirical analysis of UN organ structure and composition which maps 206 
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relationships between the economic characteristics of states and their representation in UN 207 
organs. The founding hypothesis is that state economic power is a predictor of representation in 208 
UN organs, and subsequently, influence on UN policy making, despite the establishing principle 209 
that, “The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility [of member states] … to 210 
participate … in its principal and subsidiary organs” (UN, 1945, Chap. 3, Art. 8). 211 
Methodology 212 
Current and historical UN membership data was procured from official UN websites, 213 
including websites for each organ (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2017; International 214 
Court of Justice [ICJ], 2017; UN, 2016; UN Economic and Social Council, 2017; UN Secretary 215 
General, n.d.; UN Security Council, n.d.). Gross domestic product [GDP], LDC, SIDS, and low-216 
income country data was then overlaid upon UN membership data. The list of LDCs and SIDS 217 
was retrieved from the UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, 218 
Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (2017). Both the GDP 219 
rankings for 2016 and the list of low-income countries (i.e., the World Bank’s comparable LDC 220 
designation) were obtained from the World Bank (2017). The World Bank ranked 185 of the 193 221 
UN member states in 2016. Andorra, Eritrea, North Korea, Libya, Monaco, San Marino, Syria, 222 
and Venezuela did not make GDP data available, and thus were excluded. The authors divided 223 
the list of 185 states into quartiles. Each quartile included 46 states, with the exception of the 2nd 224 
quartile (49th to 25th percentile), which included 47 states. Tajikistan, ranked 139th of UN 225 
member states, was the 47th state included in the 2nd quartile. GDP was selected as the 226 
economic/wealth indicator since it is a measure of market activity frequently used to distinguish 227 
economy size and often used in policy making. While it fails to measure human well-being and 228 
is limited in its ability to represent informal economic activity, the IBPA analysis was based on a 229 
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hypothesis that the UN favors highly developed states with large economies despite its founding 230 
principle of “sovereign equality” for all member states (UN, 1945, Chap. 1, Art. 2(1)). 231 
Results 232 
Six principal organs comprise the UN system: The General Assembly [UNGA], Security 233 
Council [UNSC], International Court of Justice [ICJ], Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC], 234 
Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat. The UNGA is the only organ requiring representation 235 
for all UN member states, and is divided into five regional groups functioning as voting blocs. 236 
With five permanent member states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 237 
States) and 10 additional rotating member states, the UNSC is widely considered the most 238 
powerful organ. The UNSC’s five permanent member states are also guaranteed representation 239 
on the ICJ, comprising one-third of the court’s 15 seats, and were the only member states 240 
represented on the Trusteeship Council, suspended in 1994. The ECOSOC, which is the primary 241 
international body for sustainable development has 54 members. The Secretariat is led by the 242 
Secretary-General, elected from one member state. 243 
Of the United Nations Security Council’s five permanent members, the United States is 244 
ranked first in GDP, China second, the United Kingdom fifth, France sixth, and Russia 12th. 245 
While the other 10 UNSC members rotate, 66 UN member states have never served on the 246 
council (UNSC, n.d.). Of those 66 members, five were not ranked by GDP. An examination of 247 
the remaining 61 states determined only two (3.0%) states are in the upper quartile globally for 248 
GDP, while 34 (55.7%) are ranked in the lower quartile (Fig. 1). Though 31 of the 47 (66.0%) 249 
states classified by the UN as a LDC have served on the UNSC, only 8 of the 27 (21.6%) states 250 
classified as a SIDS have served. Only one of the eight states classified as both, Guinea-Bissau, 251 
has filled a membership position. Though non-permanent members are selected from each of the 252 
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five regional groups, states’ candidacies for a non-permanent position must first be endorsed by 253 
their regional bloc. Once endorsed, they then must be elected by a two-thirds vote in the UNGA. 254 
States serve a two-year term, and can be re-elected. This system eschews equity for political 255 
maneuvering and favoritism. For example, since 1966 when the current regional groups were 256 
configured, only 23 (41.8%) of the Asia-Pacific Regional Group’s 55 member states have been 257 
non-permanent members of the UNSC, with one state—China—serving as a permanent member. 258 
Further, 12 of the 23 states have served multiple times, including Japan, which has represented 259 
the Asia-Pacific group 10 times since 1966 for a total of 20 years. None of the Asia-Pacific 260 
group’s SIDS have been represented on the council. 261 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 262 
All parties to the Statute of the Court (i.e., all 193 UN member states and some observer 263 
states) can nominate a candidate for the International Court of Justice (ICJ), though the state does 264 
not advance the candidate. Instead, members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, who are 265 
designated by the state, will propose the nominee. For states that are not members of the 266 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, a congruent process is established to propose candidates. To be 267 
elected, the nominee must then receive a majority two-thirds vote in concurrent voting in the 268 
UNGA and the UNSC. Only 47 of the 193 (24.3%) UN member states have ever been 269 
represented on the ICJ, including the five seats continuously held by the UNSC permanent 270 
members. Of those 47 members, 26 (55.3%) are ranked in the upper quartile of GDP; whereas, 271 
only three (6.4%) are ranked in the lower quartile (Fig. 2). Five (10.6%) judges have been 272 
appointed from one of the 47 LDCs. In February 2015, Judge Patrick Lipton Robinson from 273 
Jamaica was appointed to the court, marking the first time a SIDS was represented. No judges 274 
have been appointed from one of the eight states identified as a LDC and SIDS. 275 
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[Insert Figure 2 here] 276 
The Economic and Social Council’s [ECOSOC] 54 member states are elected for three-277 
year terms by the UNGA. Currently a set number of seats is allocated to each regional group: 278 
African Group (14), Western European and Other States Group (13), Asian Group (11), Latin 279 
American and Caribbean Group (10), and Eastern European Group (6). While historical 280 
membership data was unavailable, an analysis of the current 54 members determined that only 281 
eight LDCs are represented on the ECOSOC, comprising 14.8% of the ECOSOC body and just 282 
17.0% of all LDCs. Half of the African Group’s representatives are LDCs. However, when 283 
examining GDP rankings, 26 of the 52 (50%) ranked member states are in the upper quartile, 284 
while only six (11.5%) are ranked in the lower quartile (Fig 3). Only two of the 54 (3.7%) total 285 
members are SIDS, resulting in 5.4% of all SIDS being represented; yet, all five permanent 286 
UNSC members are also members of the ECOSOC. None of the eight states classified as both a 287 
LDC and SIDS are represented. Historical data on the ECOSOC president indicates that 37 states 288 
have been represented. One is unranked by GDP (Venezuela) and one country no longer exists 289 
(Yugoslavia). Of the remaining 35 presidential member states, 19 (54.3%) are ranked in the 290 
upper quartile for GDP, and zero are ranked in the lower quartile (Fig. 3). Three LDCs have been 291 
represented, and only one SIDS (Jamaica), which is also classified as a LDC. The Secretary-292 
General leads the Secretariat and is “appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation 293 
of the Security Council” (UN Secretary General, n.d., para. 1). The current Secretary-General is 294 
from Portugal, and the previous eight Secretary-Generals represented Korea, Ghana, Egypt, Peru, 295 
Austria, Myanmar, Sweden, and Norway. Myanmar is the only LDC to produce a Secretary-296 
General, and also has the highest ranked GDP of any LDC, ranking 69th out of the 193 member 297 
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states. No Secretary-General has been appointed from a SIDS; yet, four out of nine (44.4%) have 298 
been appointed from highly developed, Western states. 299 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 300 
 While every member state is equally represented in the UNGA’s body, the body annually 301 
elects a president for a one-year term. Candidate nominations rotate between the five regional 302 
groups, with the five UNSC permanent members excluded. A total of 71 states have been 303 
represented by the presidency, and Argentina is the only state represented twice. Of the 71 304 
presidential member states, three are unaccounted for in GDP rankings, resulting in 68 states for 305 
analysis. The UNGA leadership reflects the same dichotomy as other UN organs as 31 states 306 
(45.6%) are ranked in the upper quartile for GDP; whereas, five states (7.3%) are ranked in the 307 
lower quartile (Fig. 4). Only five (10.6%) presidents have been elected from one of the 47 LDCs, 308 
and only three (8.1%) from the 37 SIDS. No president has been elected from any of the eight 309 
member states classified by the UN as both a LDC and a SIDS. The one vote per country UNGA 310 
rule positions less developed states with small economies as equal members; however, these 311 
states may still be positioned as former colonies through the exchange of money and power for 312 
votes. In a previous longitudinal analysis of bilateral foreign aid distribution, wealthy, developed 313 
states were more likely to give financial aid to their former colonies and to states exhibiting 314 
similar voting behaviors in the UNGA (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). While these findings could 315 
reflect geopolitical alliances that are highly correlated with former colonial relationships, the 316 
authors also expressed concern that poorer states with smaller economies may try to maximize 317 
the aid they receive by aligning their votes with their former colonizer’s or other developed 318 
states’ interests (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). If the authors “preferred interpretation” of their 319 
findings is correct, “that donors favor their ‘friends’ in disbursing aid, and an observable 320 
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manifestation of ‘friendship’ is the pattern of UN votes” (Alesina & Dollar, 2000, p. 46), there 321 
should be considerations that developed states could subvert poorer states’ voting power within 322 
the UNGA.  323 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 324 
Defining economy size by the World Bank’s 2016 GDP rankings (2017), the present 325 
analysis concluded poorer, less developed states with small economies lack power and are 326 
underrepresented in all UN organs, except for the UNGA body, where representation is required. 327 
Wealthy, highly developed states, with large economies are overrepresented in all organs, usurp 328 
power from poor states and experience few checks on their power due to a monopolization of 329 
leadership positions. While the ECOSOC is the most pertinent organ to sustainable development 330 
and environmental initiatives, it is important to consider the power structures within all organs 331 
due to the interactions between organs. Further, date of admission to the UN does not appear to 332 
be a contributing factor, since only five states have been admitted post January 1, 2000: Serbia 333 
and Tuvalu (2000), Switzerland and Timor-Leste (2002), and South Sudan (2011). While Timor-334 
Leste and Tuvalu account for two of the eight (25%) states classified as a LDC and SIDS, they 335 
have both been members of the UN for at least 15 election cycles (UN, 2017c).  336 
Discussion 337 
The exploration of UN organ structure, and in particular the disparities in attainment of 338 
leadership and more influential positions within the UN, suggests power differences may be 339 
entrenched within the UN policy making system. Due to their positioning within the UN system, 340 
economically powerful states may have more ability than poorer states to dictate regulatory 341 
content in international policy-making negotiations to be congruent with their economic interests 342 
and free-market values. Though their sovereign right, this maneuvering is often for self-gain and 343 
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at the expense of the common good, which differentially impacts poorer states, and should be an 344 
area of concern during the new UNCLOS negotiations. 345 
The analyses also suggest economic power may be used by powerful states to exclude 346 
LDCs and SIDS from participating in policy making processes. Though the UNFSA attempted to 347 
increase equity by establishing an assistance fund to aid LDCs and SIDS in implementing the 348 
agreement and participating in RFMOs and other regional policy-making processes (UN, 1995), 349 
the fund has been depleted on multiple occasions (UN, 2015a), and appears to have been 350 
depleted since at least October 4th, 2016 (Oceans and Law of the Sea in the General Assembly of 351 
the United Nations, 2016)—hence poorer states’ request for more stable funding in the 352 
preparatory meeting. And, at the Eleventh Round of Informal Consultation of States Parties to 353 
UNFSA, SIDS efforts to participate in a RFMO—the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 354 
Commission [WCPFC]—were described as being “blocked”, despite continued rhetoric about 355 
empowering developing states to participate in high seas fisheries management (UN, 2015a). To 356 
encourage more developed, large economy states to contribute to a similar fund established 357 
under the Port State Measures, it was determined donor states could earmark contributions for 358 
specific projects (FAO, 2017). The 2015 UNGA resolution 69/292 agreeing to a new 359 
international legally binding instrument under UNCLOS and establishing the preparatory 360 
meetings also created a trust fund to assist LDCs in attending the preparatory meetings, but 361 
contribution to the trust fund was voluntary (UN, 2015b).  362 
To promote equity in the short-term, large economy states should be mandated to 363 
contribute to currently voluntary funds to assist LDCs and SIDS participation in policy making 364 
processes and to build their capacity for implementing new regulations and management tools—365 
a request continuously made by LDCs and SIDS (IISD, 2017).  These funds could allow LDCs 366 
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and SIDS to have prolonged and consistent engagement in low-level conference and preparatory 367 
meetings where they may have more ability to influence a policy’s substantive text, even if they 368 
are compelled to vote with powerful countries in the UNGA as previously described, and to build 369 
and/or strengthen regional partnerships. To center the interests of LDCs and SIDS, a relative and 370 
objective administrative body (e.g., FAO) should have the authority to determine fund 371 
distribution, based on standardized indicators of need which also account for relevance and 372 
acuity of the policy or action item, rather than allowing developed states to earmark contributed 373 
funds based on their own self-interests. This is particularly important when considering financial 374 
aid to assist LDCs and SIDS in augmenting capacity with new technologies. Indeed, during the 375 
fourth preparatory meeting, AOSIS, Togo, Ghana, PSIDS, and the Caribbean group sought to 376 
establish a capacity-building fund to be accessed by SIDS and LDCs citing the need for long-377 
term sustainable funding due to the unsustainable nature of voluntary trust funds (IISD, 2017). 378 
However, the United States, the European Union, Canada, and New Zealand opposed.  379 
The efforts to initiate new negotiations also demonstrated the potential for consortiums of 380 
non-governmental members (e.g., High Seas Alliance) to influence international policy making. 381 
With deliberate consideration of how these consortiums can be inclusive and equitable, they may 382 
present a more leverageable mechanism to create and accelerate new norms within international 383 
policy making that can also center underrepresented knowledge in international policy 384 
development. Many of these consortiums already feature prominent and reputable environmental 385 
organizations—typically from developed countries—that may be perceived as experts by 386 
international policy makers based on western standards of scientific merits. However, these 387 
organizations can use their privilege to amplify and promote progress made by the consortium’s 388 
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smaller organizations. This may include advancing bottom-up approaches by recognizing and 389 
scaling up successful country-specific initiatives into regional and international action. 390 
Further, the new UNCLOS area-based management tools must be designed to equalize 391 
fisheries benefits distribution between high and low-income states based on fish dependence and 392 
viable alternatives for meeting subsistence and development needs (e.g., food, nutrition, and 393 
livelihoods) (Hankivsky, 2012). The establishment of marine protected areas and their level of 394 
regulation around restricting catches will likely be one contentious area during treaty 395 
negotiations, due to commercial fishing interests. Empirical findings and modeling suggest 396 
closing the high seas could reduce inequalities in fisheries benefits distribution by 50% and 397 
global annual profitability from fishing (mostly pocketed by industrialized states) will decrease 398 
by approximately 1% for every 20% of the high seas closed in the short-term, with fishing 399 
ultimately becoming more profitable over the long-term as stocks rebound (Sumaila et al., 2015; 400 
White & Costello, 2014). Additionally, in a study of 46 low-income and fish reliant countries, 401 
models suggested 70% of the countries would experience increased catches after closing the high 402 
seas (Teh et al., 2016).  403 
Implications for Social Work 404 
Though marine governance has historically been considered beyond social work’s 405 
purview, marine degradation resulting from ineffective governance disproportionately threatens 406 
marginalized and vulnerable economies, communities, and individuals, making it a social justice 407 
issue. Social work’s person-in-environment perspective offers a unique and critically needed lens 408 
through which to clearly identify the disparate impacts of physical environmental challenges like 409 
marine degradation on social development, economic equity, and human rights. Making 410 
international marine governance more just will require social work’s disruption of entrenched 411 
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power relations through greater attention to global policymaking and advocacy on behalf of 412 
states marginalized within UN power structures. 413 
This challenge has distinct implications for social work educators and scholars as well. 414 
Growing curricular offerings in ecosocial work must place increased attention on the social 415 
justice implications of the multitude of physical environmental challenges, as well as the global 416 
power structures which govern environmental practices. Likewise, scholars of ecosocial work 417 
and social policy must extend research on policy impacts to attend more deeply to the 418 
policymaking process and its influence on the quality and content of policy solutions. Though 419 
the UN is a body of politically appointed representatives, non-governmental advocacy 420 
partnerships were influential in convening the renegotiations of UNCLOS. Social work research 421 
identifying the disparate impacts of environmental degradation could provide an opportunity for 422 
social workers to collaborate within these partnerships, and thus influence the governance of 423 
marine ecosystems and other common-pool resources governed by the UN. 424 
Conclusion 425 
Disrupting potential systemic power structures in the UN, particularly in leadership positions, 426 
could lead to marginalized states’ increased inclusion and representation in policy-making 427 
processes. By reducing inequities within the UN and subsequently high seas policy making, 428 
potential outcomes may include stabilized and increased financial aid for marginalized states to 429 
implement and adopt new regulations and technology; more equitable distribution of marine 430 
resources’ economic benefits; and, improved transparency and reduced stagnation in high seas 431 
policy making. While this analysis was specific to UNCLOS, the statistics about UN organ 432 
representation should also be understood in a larger context of social justice and inherent 433 
weaknesses in UN structures requiring reforms to more equitably support vulnerable states. 434 
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Endnotes 435 
1 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ (FAO) (1993) Agreement to 436 
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing 437 
Vessels on the High Seas; (1995) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries; (2002) 438 
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 439 
Fishing; and (2009) Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, 440 
Unreported, Unregulated Fishing. United Nations’ (1995) Fish Stocks Agreement and (2012) 441 
Conference on Sustainable Development. 442 
 443 
2 LDCs and SIDS are both designations bestowed by the UN, based on indicators of 444 
socioeconomic vulnerabilities. The SIDS designation also considers environmental 445 
vulnerabilities resulting from unique island geographies. As such, not all SIDS are also classified 446 
as a LDC. 447 
 448 
 449 
 450 
 451 
 452 
 453 
 454 
 455 
 456 
 457 
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